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Cooperative behaviour often emerges at a group, rather than social level. In
many instances we observe the formation of independent and sometime com-
peting groups, teams, clubs, cooperatives (coalitions for short) each of them
persecuting the same goal (in turn provision of commodities, maximization
of pro…ts, raising of public funds, standards of behaviour etc.). Examples
of this behaviour are numerous both at micro and macro level: scienti…c re-
search groups, university departments, consumers’ associations, …rms as or-
ganizations, consumption and production cooperatives, industrial districts,
international commercial treatises among countries are all instances of vol-
unteer agreements among independent parties that coalesce to obtain a same
goal. Once coalitions form, society is partitioned in a coalitional structure.
This fact has already been observed and studied in a number of works from
di¤erent points of view: among them [7], [1], [11] dealt with the problem of
coalition formation for the provision of public goods, [8] with the problem
of the formation of cooperatives of workers with di¤erent working capacity,
[6], [2], [3], [4] dealt more directly with the problem of coalitional structures
formation in more general settings (see [10] for an excellent review). In these
worksit has been stressed that the formation of cooperating groupsis a¤ected
by a moral hazard problem whenever private actions cannot be monitored;
this fact may contribute to determine the extent to which cooperation can
be sustained as a self-enforcing equilibrium. The quoted works show that the
cooperative agreement is self-sustained if the coalition size is under a certain
threshold, whereas it would not be incentive compatible in larger coalitions;
these conclusions are much in the spirit of [13] (see also [12])
This work takes a similar approach but with a di¤erent strategy: …rst
we …nd a set of conditions under which cooperation can emerge in groups
that are subsets of the whole population; then we determine the limits to the
sustainability of cooperative behaviour within coalitions and …nally we study
how a society will form a coalitional structure. We approach the problem
in two steps; …rst we examine agents’ behaviour within each of the possi-
ble coalitions can form and we investigate the kind of equilibria that we
can expect to emerge, coalitions taken as given: we show that the equilib-
ria of the infra-coalitional interaction depend on individual characteristics
(outside opportunities) of agents, returns to scale of the available technology
for the transformation of cooperative e¤orts in output and the distributive
rule governing the allocation of the obtained output. Once we know how
people behave in a coalition, we proceed backward and study what kind of
coalitional structures can form in such a way that no one has an incentive
to deviate from. In this stage we shall see that the equilibrium coalitional
1structures depend on the institutional settings ruling the degree of social
mobility within population. We examine two extreme institutional arrange-
ments: in the …rst we assume there to be perfect mobility and capacity to
change coalitions, while, in the other, we assume an extremely limited mo-
bility due to the fact that even a single veto can forbid the formation of a
coalitional structure. As we shall see, these two extreme cases will give rise
to two di¤erent sets of equilibrium coalitional structures.
In our setting agents can engage in pre-play non-binding communication
among themselves (see [8]). By this they can agree on pareto-dominating,
self-enforcingequilibria in any occasion a selection problemis concerned with.
However, just because such pre-play talks are unbinding, no one can be forced
to perform actions not compatible with individual incentives and, for exam-
ple, cooperate when only group rationality would call for it. Therefore we
adopt a mixed approach in which we suppose agents can deal each other and
constraint themselves in a binding manner, but in full respect of the individ-
ual freedom non to participate in any agreement which provides individual
(and coalitional as well) incentives to deviate from. This approach is not new
in the literature and we refer to the extensive work of [9] and [10] for further
reference.
The work is clearly limited by some strong assumptions that we make;
among them
² the fact that all individuals are identical
² the fact that the distribution rule is …xed
² the fact that we do not examine intermediate institutional settings, in
which social mobility may be just partially inhibited.
A throughout work should get rid of these assumptions; however, in this
work, we keep them as simplifying devices in order to carry out an analysis
capable of manageable results. Section 2 describes the basic characteristics
of the economy; Section 3 …nds what will be the equilibrium self-enforcing
outcomes within any possible coalition; Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium
outcomes of the coalitional structure formation process under the two dif-
ferent institutional settings mentioned above; …nally Section 5 examines and
compares the properties of the two di¤erent kinds of equilibrium coalitional
structures. Conclusions close the paper with some insight into further work.
22 Description of the model
There is a population = of I agents indexed by i; they are supposed identical
in all characteristics and endowed with one unit of time and one unit of
a physical capital. Capital is used with labour to produce a consumption
commodity Y by means of a publicly and freely available technology. There
are no alternative uses for capital.
Agents can produce the commodity Y either in isolation or within a
group. It takes place in a group when agents in a subset S µ = pool their
capital units; then agents independently decide the amount of their own
time to spend on production. The contribution of the capital endowment is
a necessary and su¢cient condition to have the right to receive a share of
the produced output.
Given a coalition S for the production and distribution of the commodity
Y , let XS denote the cardinality of S. A coalition S is proper if 2 · XS · I;
if XS = 1, S is a singleton. A coalitional structure is a partition of = into
subsets and is denoted by ¾ = fS1;S2;:::;Sj;:::;SJg, where J 2 N+ is the
number of non-empty groups in the coalitional structure ¾. Any coalitional
structure must satisfy the following properties: SJ
j=1Sj = =
8(h;j), h 6= j, Sh \ Sj = ;, Sh;Sj 2 ¾.
Let § be the set of all possible coalitional structures in =.
2.1 Individual characteristics
Let li denote the amount of time that agent i spends on production, li 2 [0;1].
If an agent chooses to participate into a coalition S he must …rst contribute
his own capital endowment; then he has to decide the amount of time li
to dedicate to production; hence (1 ¡ li) is the leisure time. The more he
spends his time on production, the more the total output increases; but one
unit of leisure gives him an utility of !1. An agent can always decide not to
participate in a coalition; in such a case he keeps his capital endowment to
produce in autharchy.
Agents’ utility depends on consumption of commodity and on leisure.
For simplicity purposes, the utility function is assumed to be linear in all its
arguments and takes the form
Ui = yi + (1 ¡ li) ¢ !
where yi is the quantity agent i receives of commodity Y .
1Since agents are supposed identical, the outside opportunity will not be indexed by i.
3An agent spending his time on production will be called a cooperator, a
defector otherwise. Agents can choose to contribute even a fraction of their
working capacity, i.e. 0 · li · 1, but they are not allowed to play mixed
strategies.
Finally we assume that, whereas individual capital contributions can be
publicly observed, li isa variable known only to agent i and cannot be directly
monitored by anyone else.
2.1.1 Technological characteristics
The technology available for the production of Y can be represented by a
production function F (K;L), where K is the capital stock and L is the
amount of labour; clearly, in any coalition, 0 · L · K since no one will
contribute his own working e¤ort in a coalition in which he has no right
to receive the produced output. We assume F (:;:) to satisfy the following
properties.
Axiom 1 The production function F (K;L) is such that
1. F (K;L) = A ¢ minfK®;L®g
2. 2 ¢ ! > A > !
3. ® > 0
Notice that Axiom 1 together with 0 · L · K yield to F (K;L) =
A¢L®. The particular form of the production function is a simplifying device,
allowing for returns to scale to labour invariant to the amount of the working
e¤ort put into the production process; the magnitude of the returns to scale
depends on the value of ®. The fact that the scale parameter A is greater
than the outside opportunity serves only to induce the performing of the
working e¤ort when an agent acts alone, while the fact that 2¢ ! > A serves
to exclude that cooperation may arise in proper coalitions for reasons that are
not just strategic. It is worth noticing that the production within a coalition
of size K has no external e¤ect on the production of other coalitions (see
[10]).
2.1.2 Distributive characteristics
Once the total output Y is produced in agiven coalition by the workinge¤orts
of some of its members, it is then redistributed within the same coalition.
The distribution of Y is governed by an equal sharing rule R that we assume
4to be the same in all coalitions; in other words all members of a coalition
that contributed their capital endowments have the right to receive an same
share of the total output Y , independently of the respective contribution in
terms of working e¤ort. This assumption is motivated by the fact that, li
being unobservable and the capital assets having equal values, there are no
means to discriminate among the participants to a coalition.
To be more precise on the form of R, take a generic coalition S of cardi-
nality XS and say that Y S is the total output produced within S by means




; then for all
i 2 S we have
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where Ri(:) denotes the quantity that the distributive rule R allocates to
agent i. In view of this, the payo¤ to an agent i from a coalition S which he







+ (1 ¡ li) ¢ !
It is clear that, once the level of cooperation
P
j2S lj is given, defectors are
always better o¤ than cooperators in any coalition. However the essence of
the social game we are going to examine in the …rst part of the paper is
whether it is worth or not, from the individual point of view, to increase the
level of cooperation considering that the working e¤ort a¤ects the coalitional
output and that this returns as a bene…t to the subject via the distributive
rule, but, at the same time, this reduces leisure.
3 Individual decisions and equilibria within
coalitions
Before dealing with the problem of how a society will structure itself in coali-
tions, we examine how people behave within any possible coalition and which
kind of equilibria we can expect in it. We are looking for self-enforcing equi-
libria, i.e. equilibria no one has an incentive to deviate from. The strategy
we follow to prove the existence of such kind of equilibria is the following:
…rst we prove the existence of Nash equilibria (NE), i.e. equilibria robust to
unilateral deviations, in the game taking place within a coalition S of XS
agents when they are to decide the level of their time to dedicate to produc-
tion, given that they have already committed to S. Thereafter we check for
5individual rationality of NEs; this is a very important step since agents will
always be able to improve upon individually not rational solutions by with-
drawing from actual coalitions creating new ones (remember that production
in autharchy is always a possibility).
3.1 Incentive compatible and individually rational NE
within given coalitions
In order to pursue the analysis let us take a generic coalition S ½ = and an
agent i 2 S. Furthermore suppose agent has correct expectations about the
level of cooperation supplied by the other agents in S and that this level will
not be a¤ected by his own action. Then we can state the following theorem
concerning existence of incentive compatible NEs in S; as to the terminology
full cooperation, partial cooperation and full defection stand for situations
in which li = 1, 0 < li < 1 and li = 0 respectively 8i 2 S.
Proposition 1 Suppose the economy satis…es Assumption 1 and that the
distributive rule R is an equal sharing rule; then
1. in any singleton coalition, li = 1 is the dominant strategy;
2. if ® · 1, partial cooperation is the only NE in any proper coalition;
3. if ® > 1, generalized defection is always a NE in any proper coalition;
4. For any X ¸ 2 there exists a value ®X < 2, such that full cooperation
is a NE in any coalition with cardinality up to X provided ® ¸ ®X; if
® < ®X at least those coalitions with cardinality greater than X admit
full defection as the only NE.
5. if ® > ®I ´ ®¤ full cooperation is a NE in any proper coalition.
The proof of this Proposition is rather long and is postponed to the
Appendix. Substantially it establishes that in aproper coalition of cardinality
XS there are either one or two NE depending on the returns to scale of the
coalitional production function.
Now we turn to individual rationality of incentive compatible NE, since
individually not rational outcomes will not be accepted as equilibrium out-
comes. Results are summarized in the following list of remarks, where we
always assume the economy to satisfy Assumption 1 and the distributive rule
R to be of the equal sharing type, as in Proposition 1.
Remark 1 If ® · 1, NE are not individually rational in any proper coalition.
6Proof. If returns to scale are at most costant, the only NE in any proper
coalition is a partial cooperation one, in which the working e¤ort supplied












A level ¹ l of cooperation is pro…table if it grants each agent at least the payo¤
he could get by himself acting as a singleton, i.e. if
A¢
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S ¸ 1: (2)
Substituting from equation (1) into (2) we get that the NE, when returns to



















where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.2. Hence the partial
cooperation equilibrium is never individually rational in any coalition with
at least two agents.
Remark 2 Full defection equilibria are never individually rational.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from equation (2), since it can never
be satis…ed for ¹ l = 0 and XS > 0.
Remark 3 Full cooperation NE (provided it exists) is individually rational.
Proof. >From Proposition 1 we know that full cooperation can emerge in
proper coalitions only if returns to scale are increasing, i.e. ® > 1. It can
easily be checked that equation (2) is always satis…ed for for such values of
® and any XS ¸ 1.
Summarizing, full cooperation is the only individually rational NE, pro-
vided it exists. The payo¤ one gets in any other equilibria (i.e. full defection
7and sometimes partial cooperation) can be improved upon by withdrawing
from the corresponding coalition and producing in autharchy as a singleton.
The substance of the story stylized in the Proposition 1 and Remarks 1, 2
e 3 issimple. If returnstoscale are not increasing, there isnoincentive to pool
together resources, since the allocation rule grants anyone no more than he
can do by himself. Incentive to coalesce exist only when there are increasing
returns from cooperation. Once this condition is met, cooperation is easier
to emerge in groups of limited size (the extent of the maximal coalition
capable of sustaining cooperation depends positively on the strength of the
returns to scale). The fact that full cooperation can be sustained in coalitions
not greater than a certain threshold can be explained in the following way.
Suppose all agents in a coalition S of cardinality XS are cooperating at full
extent: their payo¤ is A ¢ X
®¡1
S . Suppose further that XS is a continuous
variable; if an agent outside the coalition bids for entering and cooperating
into S, each of the preexisting XS agents will receive an increase in payo¤
equal to the per-capita marginal product of the new agent, i.e. (® ¡ 1) ¢ A ¢
X
®¡2
S . The new coalition will continue sustaining full cooperation provided,
in the new setting, defection will not be more rewarding than cooperation, i.e.
provided (® ¡ 1) ¢ A ¢ X
®¡2
S ¸ !. If ® < 2, the left-hand side is a decreasing
function of the coalitional cardinality, so that there will be a value of XS
constituting an upper bound to the cardinality of the coalition that can
sustain cooperation.
3.2 The value of a coalition
In the Proposition 1 section we showed that, when ® > 1, in some coalitions
there can be two pure strategies Nash equilibria: a full cooperation and a full
defection one. However a serious coordination problem never arises, since the
full defection equilibrium will never be adhered to by agents for at least two
reasons: …rst of all it is not an individually rational equilibrium (see Remark
1), since agents have always the opportunity to leave the coalition and form
a singleton granting more to themselves (A rather than !). Secondly, in such
a situation, there is always the possibility for a single or a group of agents
to agree to a (joint) deviation forming a cooperating subgroup such that the
best reply of everyone in the complementary coalition is to cooperate as well,
thus increasing coalitional and individual welfare. Hence, by allowing for
a pre-ply communication stage, we can conclude that the only meaningful
Nash equilibrium, when a multiplicity is possible, is the full cooperation one
that is both individually rational and coalition-proof (as de…ned in [5]).
Therefore we can say that, given returns to scale as speci…ed by the
parameter ®, people will accept to cooperate at full extent in all coalitions
8in which such behaviour is incentive compatible. By this we can de…ne the
value to an agent i of a coalition S which he belongs to; in order to do this, let
¹ X® be the cardinality of the greatest coalition that can sustain cooperation
when returns to scale are given by ®2. Then we can pose the following:
De…nition 1 The value Vi(S) of a coalition S to an agent i is the payo¤
that he can get in the NE for that coalition, i.e. 8i 2 S 2 ¾ 2 §
® 2 [0;1] ) Vi(S) · A




S if XS · ¹ X®
0 if XS > ¹ X®
® > ®¤ ) Vi(S) = A ¢ X
®¡1
S
In words the value function Vi (S) simply says that all agents recognize
and agree that mutual cooperation will be the outcome of their interaction
whenever it is possible, where possible means that in playing cooperatively
no one, neither in a group nor in isolation, will be incentivated to deviate
from the reached agreement. Out of these situations, the impossibility to
make binding commitments to cooperate compels agents to recognize that
the value of their participation to the coalition is lower than the payo¤ of the
sure alternative that they have always the possibility to choose, i.e. withdraw
and act as singletons. For the sake of convention the value of the coalition
in this case is set to 0.
4 Equilibrium coalitional structures
Regarding the analysis of coalitional structure formation we con…ne to the
case 1 < ® < ®¤. The reason for this is simple; if we allow ® ¸ ®¤, there will
be no disagreement to agree to mutual cooperation in the grand coalition
=. Indeed, by Proposition 1, we know that, when returns to scale are sub-
stantial (® > ®¤), cooperation is an equilibrium outcome in any coalition,
= included; then, in the pre-play communication stage, agents will recog-
nize the advantages of cooperating together since this behaviour maximizes
all individual utility and is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Therefore the whole society will structure as a sole grand coalition in which
everyone cooperates.
The most interesting behaviours can be observed when returns to scale,
given with the distributive rule, do not allow for aggregation of the society
as a whole. In this case there will be con‡icts among the agents about how
2In other words, ¹ X® is the greatest integer in the set fXj®X · ®g.
9to partition society and which coalitions to participate into. As we will see,
the equilibrium outcomes of the coalitional structure formation game depend
crucially on the institutional settings ruling the capacity of agents to form
new coalitions and disrupt already existing ones.
Here we take into account two extreme institutional settings. In the …rst
agents are absolutely free to formand disrupt coalitions, in order to maximize
individual payo¤. In the second, individual mobility is constrained by the
vetoes that some agents in a coalition can cast against the transfer of (some
of) the other members when this would induce a loss in the payo¤ levels of
the former ones. We shall analyze the two cases separately.
4.1 Perfect mobility
First we examine the case in which agents are completely free to form coali-
tions and abandon previously established ones, provided they obtain a gain
for themselves, independently of what happens to the others. An equilibrium
within this institutional setting will be a coalitional structure with respect
to which no further rearrangement of coalitions (i.e. transfer of people from
a coalition to another) can turn out advantageous to the members of at least
one newly formed coalition. In order to make this de…nition rigorous, let
¼¾
i be the payo¤ that agent i receives when he belongs to a coalition in the
coalitional structure ¾; we say that a coalitional structure ¾0 is preferred by
a coalition S0 2 ¾0 to the coalitional structure ¾ if ¼¾0
i > ¼¾
i 8i 2 S0, i.e. if a
coalition in ¾0 exists such that all its members are better o¤ than in ¾. Let us
denote by P (¾) =
©
¾0 2 §j9S0 2 ¾0 : ¼¾0
i > ¼¾
i 8i 2 S0ª
the set of coalitional
structures that are preferred by at least a coalition to the coalitional struc-
ture ¾. If perfect mobility is allowed, then a coalitional structure ¾ can, and
indeed will, be disrupted if P (¾) 6= ;, i.e. if at least a new coalition (and
hence a di¤erent coalitional structure) can form in which all its members ob-
tain a positive increment in payo¤. The disruption of the existing coalitional
structure ¾ takes place independently of what happens to the other agents
in ==S. These remaining agents have no countermove but a rearrangement
among themselves; as a consequence of this rearrangement some of the orig-
inal deviators could be induced to come back forming a di¤erent coalitional
structure and so on. When this process admits no further move, i.e. when a
position is found such that no group of people can improve upon their payo¤,
we have reached an equilibrium. This leads to the following de…nition:
De…nition 2 A coalitional structure ¾¤ 2 § is an equilibrium with perfect
mobility (PMCE) if P (¾¤) = ;.
In order to clarify this de…nition examine the following example.
10Example 1 Suppose we have a population of six agents, i.e. = = f1;2;3;4;5;6g.
The technological and individual parameters are such that A = 3, ® = 1:5
and ! = 2. Simple computation shows that
Vi(S) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
3 if XS = 1
4:2 if XS = 2
5:2 if XS = 3
6 if XS = 4
0 if XS = 5
0 if XS = 6
Take the coalitional structure ¾ = ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg; clearly P (¾) 6=
; since any coalitional structure ¾0 containing a coalition S0 with XS0 =
4 will be preferred to ¾ by S0 itself. Also the coalitional structure ¹ ¾ =
ff1;2;3;4g;f5g;f6gg can be disrupted, since the coalitional structure ¾00 =
ff1;2;3;4g;f5;6gg 2 P (¹ ¾); indeed, in the last coalitional structure, both
agents 5 and 6 receive 4.2 rather than 3 and hence they increase their own
welfare. Finally the coalitional structure ¾¤ = ff1;2;3;4g;f5;6gg cannot be
disrupted by any coalition since no other group can form at mutual advantage
of all its participants, so that it is a PMCE.
Note that, in the de…nition of PMCE, agents are concerned with their own
payo¤ maximization and are free to form any coalition they want, but have
no power in blocking the formation of a coalitional structure in which an even
negligible group gets an increase in payo¤, while all the others su¤er a loss.
In other words the formation and the acceptance of coalitional structures is
subject to group consensus, but there is no veto power.
Before dealing with the main result of this section, let us pose the fol-
lowing notation: ¹ N® = I mod ¹ X® and ¹ Q® = I ¡ ¹ N® ¢ ¹ X®. In order to avoid
trivial situations let us suppose ¹ Q® > 0. Then we can introduce the following
de…nition:
De…nition 3 A coalitional structure ¾ is concentrated when it is formed
by exactly ¹ N®+1 coalitions such that ¹ Q® · XS · ¹ X®; a coalitional structure
¾ is maximally concentrated when it is concentrated and ¹ N® coalitions
has the maximal cardinality ¹ X® while the last one has cardinality ¹ Q®.
We can now state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the economy satis…es Assumption 1, ® 2 (1;®¤]
and the distribution is governed by an equal sharing rule R. Then all the
maximally concentrated coalitional structures are PMCE for the coalitional
structures formation game.
11Proof. First we prove that, in equilibrium, all coalitional structures must
be formed by exactly ¹ N® + 1 coalitions.
1. If a coalitional structure ¾ were composed by less than ¹ N®+1 coalitions,
then there would exist at least one coalition, say S, with more than ¹ X®
agents; in this case all members of S would withdraw from S since,
so doing, they get a higher payo¤ (at least A rather 0). Therefore
any coalitional structure ¾0 containing a coalition S0 ½ S such that
XS0 · ¹ X® would be preferred to ¾ by S0, so that P (¾) 6= ;. This
shows that in equilibrium there must be at least ¹ N® + 1 coalitions.
2. If a coalitional structure ¾ were composed by more than ¹ N® + 1 coali-
tions, than at least two of them, say S1 and S2, should contain less than
¹ X® agents. But then a coalition S0 could form such that S0 µ S1 [ S2
and ¹ X® ¸ XS0 > minfXS1;XS2g; all the members of S0 will get a pay-
o¤ Vi (S0) > maxfVi (S1);Vi(S2)g. Therefore any coalitional structure
¾0 3 S0 would be preferred to ¾, so that P (¾) 6= ;. This shows that any
coalitional structure with more that ¹ N®+1 coalitions can be disrupted
and hence, in equilibrium, there can be at most ¹ N® + 1 coalitions.
>From the above points, an equilibrium coalitional structure must be
concentrated. Now it is immediate to see that in any PMCE there cannot
exist a coalition with a cardinality greater than ¹ X®, since, would it exist, a
new subcoalition could form disrupting the given coalitional structure as in
point 1 above. On the other hand, in a PMCE no two coalitions can have
fewer than ¹ X® members, since, in this case, the same reasoning as in point
2 above could be applied. Combining these facts together, the statement of
the Proposition is proved.
According to the Proposition, there is a multiplicity of equilibria each of
them corresponding to one possible way of combining I agents in ¹ N® + 1
coalitions, with ¹ N® having the maximal cardinality ¹ X®. However the struc-
ture of all PMCE is always the same (maximally concentrated), only the
identity of the members in coalitions change. In Section 5 we shall use this
fact to examine some basic properties of this kind of equilibria.
4.2 Veto power
Here we analyze a di¤erent institutional setting characterized by the fact that
agents are still trying to exploit all opportunities to increase the coalitional
outcome, but now they are endowed also with a veto power, i.e. each of them
12can successfully cast an opposition to the formation of coalitional structures
in which he gets a lower payo¤. In other words it is as if agents, in forming
coalitions, signed contracts with the following clause: anyone of them will
be able to leave the coalition he belongs to only if the other members give
him their consensus not su¤ering any loss. Of course, when some agents
can get an advantage from the formation of a certain coalitional structure
with no other su¤ering a loss (a Pareto improvement for the society as a
whole), then no vetoes will be opposed; however, when the payo¤ maximizing
attempts by someone will induce a loss to someone else, the latter ones will
oppose their vetoes and will not allow the formation of the new coalitional
structure. When we …nd a coalitional structure in which any further attempt
to increase someone’s payo¤ encounters the veto of someone else, then we
have reached an equilibrium; we shall call such a position a vetoing coalitional
equilibrium (VCE). As in the case of PMCE, …rst we have to make this
de…nition rigorous. Suppose that society is arranged in a coalitional structure
¾; we say that a coalitional structure ¾0 2 §, ¾0 6= ¾, is vetoed by someone
if there exists at least an agent who su¤er a reduction in his payo¤ passing
from ¾ to ¾0, i.e. 9i 2 = such that ¼¾0
i < ¼¾
i . Let Wi (¾) be the set of
coalitional structures that are vetoed if society happens to be structured as
in ¾, i.e. W (¾) =
©




. Finally let P (¾) have the
same meaning as in Section 4.1, i.e. it is the set of coalitional structures in
which a coalition could form with a net positive bene…t for all its members
with respect to what they get in ¾. Then we can pose the following de…nition:
De…nition 4 A coalitional structure ¾¤ 2 § is a VCE if P (¾¤)nW (¾¤) = ;.
The interpretation of this de…nition is simple: consider ¾¤ and take a
coalitional structure in ¾ 2 P (¾¤); this means that in ¾ there is at least a
coalition that was not in ¾¤ and in which all members get a higher payo¤.
Since P (¾¤)nW (¾¤) = ;, then ¾ belongs to W (¾¤) as well, i.e. there will
be some agent su¤ering from the rearrangement leading to ¾; if a veto power
is allowed and accepted, the latter people will object to the formation of
¾ and this coalitional structure will not form. When vetoes are opposed
to any coalitional structure that provides individual and group incentive to
its formation, then we have reached a position which no one, willingly or
unwillingly, moves from, i.e. we are in an equilibrium. As it can be easily
checked, the set of VCE corresponds to the set of coalitional structures giving
rise to Pareto e¢cient distributions of payo¤s, given the distributive rule R.
An example can clarify concepts.




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
3 if XS = 1
4:2 if XS = 2
5:2 if XS = 3
6 if XS = 4
0 if XS = 5
0 if XS = 6
Take the coalitional structure ¾ = ff1;2;3g;f4;5g;f6gg and the coalitional
structure ¾0 = ff1;2;3;4g;f5;6gg. Clearly ¾0 2 P (¾) since the coalition
of the …rst four agents improves with respect to ¾; however ¾0 = 2 W (¾)
since no one is worse o¤ in ¾0 with respect to ¾. Therefore ¾ can and
will be disrupted in favour of ¾0. Consider now the coalitional structure
¾00 = ff1;2;3g;f4;5;6gg. It is easy to check that ¾0 2 W (¾00) since agents 5
and 6 will su¤er a loss in ¾0 with respect to ¾00 but ¾0 2 P (¾00) since the coali-
tion of the …rst four agent gets an improvement. In this case the coalitional
structure ¾00 cannot be disrupted.
We now turn to the existence problem and to the description of the char-
acteristics of VCE in terms of coalitions. The main result is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the economy satis…es Assumption 1, ® 2 (1;®¤)
and the distribution is governed by an equal sharing rule R. Then all the
concentrated coalitional structures are VCE for the coalitional structures for-
mation game.
Proof. First we prove that in any equilibrium coalitional structure there are
exactly ¹ N® + 1 coalitions.
1. Suppose there exists an equilibrium coalitional structure ¾ with fewer
than ¹ N®+1 coalitions; then at least one of them, say coalition S, must
possess more than ¹ X® members so that the value of their coalition
is 0. Now construct a coalitional structure ¾0 obtained by ¾ simply
replacing S by two or more coalitions with cardinality less than or
equal to ¹ X®, the rest of the coalitional structure remaining the same.
The new coalitional structure ¾ would be such that ¾0 2 P (¾) and
¾0 = 2 W (¾) since the members of new coalitions strictly improve their
situations, while the rest of the population is una¤ected. From this we
get P (¾) * W (¾), i.e. ¾ cannot be a VCE.
2. Now suppose that the equilibrium coalitional structure ¾ possesses
more than ¹ N® + 1 coalitions; suppose further than no one of them has
14more than ¹ X® members, otherwise the same reasoning as in point 1
above could be applied. Then arrange them in decreasing order of car-
dinality, obtaining the sequence S1, S2;:::;S ¹ N+1;:::;S ¹ N®+1+v, v > 0,
with XS1 > ::: > XS ¹ N®+1+v. Now take the coalitional structure ¾0 ob-
tained from ¾ by redistributing the agents in
Sv
j=1S ¹ N®+1+j over the
coalitions S1;:::;S ¹ N®+1 in such a way that XS0 · ¹ X® for any S0 2 ¾0.
Any of the new coalitions contains at least the same number of agents
as in ¾ so that ¼¾0
i ¸ ¼¾
i 8i and ¼¾0
i > ¼¾
i for all the members of at least
a coalition S0 2 ¾0. This means that ¾0 2 P (¾) and ¾0 = 2 W (¾). Again
we have P (¾) * W (¾), i.e. ¾ cannot be a VCE.
Thus far we proved that any VCE must possess exactly ¹ N® + 1 coali-
tions. No equilibrium coalitional structure can possess a coalition S with
more than ¹ X®, because such coalitional structure would be dominated by
the one in which the members of S withdraw to form singleton coalitions.
No equilibrium coalitional structure can possess a coalition with less than
¹ Q® agents because, in this case, there would exist another coalition with
more than ¹ X® agents and the previous reasoning could be applied. There-
fore equilibrium coalitional structures must be made up of coalitions with a
cardinality included in the interval
£ ¹ Q®; ¹ X®
¤
. On the other hand all coali-







such that ¹ Q® · XS¤
j · ¹ N® 8j 2
£









be the corresponding distribution of individual payo¤s;
only coalitional structures ¾¤¤ such that ¼¾¤¤ ¸ ¼¾¤ will not be vetoed. But
given that Vi(S) is monotonically increasing in the cardinality of S up to
¹ X®, the condition ¼¾¤¤ ¸ ¼¾¤ can be satis…ed only if there is an increase
in the number of cooperators in at least a non maximal coalition. Since,
by construction, cooperation is the observed behaviour in any coalition in
¾¤, the above result can be obtained just by an increase in the number of
agents forming population =, which contradicts the assumption of a …xed
population. This ends the proof of the Proposition.
It is worth noting that the set of PMCE is included in the set of VCE;
in other words the possibility of an e¤ective veto increases the number of
possible self-enforcing agreements.
5 Properties of coalitional equilibria
In this Section we compare the equilibrium outcomes within the institutional
settings examined in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
155.1 Perfect mobility coalitional equilibria
>From Proposition 2 we know that any PMCE is characterized by a maxi-
mally concentrated coalitional structure. First of all we prove the following:
Remark 4 In any maximally concentrated coalitional structure, and hence
in any PMCE, the aggregate production is greater than in any other (not
maximally) concentrated coalitional structure.
Proof. Take a ¹ N® +1-dimensional vector ¸ = (¸1;:::;¸ ¹ N®+1); 0 · ¸j · 1,
such that the …rst coalition in ¾ has cardinality ¸1 ¢ ¹ X®, the second ¸2 ¢ ¹ X®,
the ¹ Nth ¸ ¹ N ¢ ¹ X®; for the de…nition of ¸ we have that
P ¹ N®+1
j=1 ¸j ¢ ¹ X® = I,




¸j ¢ ¹ X®
¢®. In order
to maximize Y¾ with respect to ¸ we have to put the maximum number of
¸i equal to 1 (remember that
@Y¾
@¸i > 0 and
@2Y¾
@¸2
i > 0 and ¸i · 1 8i). Because
P ¹ N®+1
j=1 ¸j ¢ ¹ X® = I, then I mod ¹ X® = ¹ N® gives the maximum number
of ¸i that we can set equal to 1, while ¸ ¹ N®+1 = I ¡ ¹ N® ¢ ¹ X®, from which
¹ Q® = ¸ ¹ N®+1 ¢ ¹ X®. This completes the proof.
Therefore a social planner who would maximize only the social output,
independently of its distribution, should opt for an institutional setting with
perfect mobility, since he is sure that the equilibrium coalition structure is
maximally concentrated and hence the aggregate output is maximized.
5.2 Vetoing coalitional equilibria
When VCE are concerned, both maximally and not-maximally concentrated
coalitional structures may be the equilibrium outcome of social interaction;
however some properties characterizes this kind of equilibria. Then we can
state3
Remark 5 The total expected equilibrium outcome in a social setting char-
acterized by a vetoing power is not greater than the total output obtainable
in the case of perfect mobility i.e.
E (Y¾) · Y¾¤ ¾
¤ PMCE and ¾ VCE
Proof. The proof of the statement is simple: by Remark 4 we know that
total output is maximized in maximally concentrated coalitional structures;
therefore the total output obtainable in a VCE is certainly at most as much
3We assume that probability of at least a not maximally concentrated VCE is positive.
16as that in a PMCE. It follows that the average total output over the VCE
set is not greater than the output obtainable in a PMCE.
The next result concerns the distribution of payo¤s within a VCE. Let
¼¾ = f¼¾
1;:::;¼¾
Ig be the distribution of payo¤s in a coalitional structure ¾
and let ^ ¼
¾ = min¼¾. Notice that in any maximally concentrated coalitional
structure ^ ¼
¾ = A ¢
¡ ¹ Q®
¢®¡1; call this value ^ ¼
¾¤
. Then we can state the
following4:
Remark 6 The expected payo¤ of the agent in the worst position in a VCE
is at least as much as the expected payo¤ of the same agent in a PMCE i.e.
E (^ ¼
¾) ¸ ^ ¼
¾¤
¾
¤ PMCE and ¾ VCE
Proof. First we show that the agent in the worst position in a VCE that is
not maximally concentrated, gets a higher payo¤ that an agent in the same
position gets in a maximally concentrated coalitional structure, i.e. ^ ¼
¾ > ^ ¼
¾¤
for any given not-maximally concentrated ¾. Clearly the agent with the worst
payo¤ in a maximally concentrated coalition belongs to the residual coalition
of cardinality ¹ Q®. Another coalitional structure that grants to the agent in
the worst position the same payo¤ must be again maximally concentrated,
because there is no other way of arranging the remaining I ¡ ¹ Q® agents in
¹ N® coalitions preserving individual incentives to cooperation, i.e. remaining
within the equilibrium set. Therefore a rearrangement of agents not leading
to a maximally concentrated coalitional structure must grant the worst o¤
agent a payo¤ greater than ^ ¼
¾¤
. From this it follows that the expected payo¤
of the worst o¤ agent in a VCE must be higher than the payo¤ the same agent
could get in a PMCE since, in the latter case, all coalitional structures are
maximally concentrated.
>From the Remarks 5 and 6 we have that VCE have lower expected
aggregate output than PMCE do, but preserve the worst o¤ agent since his
expected payo¤ is greater in a VCE than in a PMCE. From this it follows also
that an egalitarian social planner may prefer (and induce) an institutional
setting giving rise to VCE (by allowing veto power) rather than a perfect
mobility istitutional setting. So, for example, aRawlsian social planner would
certainly prefer a VCE to a PMCE, but even other social preferences are
compatible with the same choice. Suppose, for instance, that the social
planner’s welfare function is of the form W (¼1;:::;¼I) =
PI
i=1f (¼i); then,
by the Shorrocks’ theorem, we can assert that there always exists a concave
function f (f0 > 0, f00 < 0), such that VCE are preferred to PMCE.
4See the previous note.
175.3 A graphical illustration
The following example graphically shows the properties regarding the two
kinds of equilibria. Suppose that the economy is characterized by values
of the individual (!) and technological (A and ®) parameters such that 1 <
¹ X®
I < 2, i.e. there will be at most two coalitions in any equilibrium coalitional
structure. Therefore we can represent all possible con…gurations in a plane



















The horizontal axis shows the cardinality of the …rst coalition, S1, while
the vertical axis shows the cardinality of the second coalition S2. The line
II represents the locus of allocations of the I agents in the two possible
coalitions. Every point in the square ¹ X® £ ¹ X® corresponds to a coalitional
structure in which the cardinality of the largest coalition is compatible with
the incentives to mutual cooperation by all its members. For instance C
(or D) represents a partition of the whole society into two coalitions; the
…rst possesses the maximal cardinality ¹ X®, while the second is the residual
coalition. A point as W represents a coalitional structure with two coalitions
of cardinality ¹ X® in which everyone cooperates; however such a point is not
a¤ordable because there should be more than I agents.
The two curves labelled Y 1 and Y 2 are aggregate isoproduct curves, i.e.
any point on each of them shows how many cooperating agents should be
in the two coalitions in order to have the same amount of aggregate output.
Since the coalitional production function F (:;:) is convex, and the sum of
18convex functions is convex as well, the isoproduct curves are bowed out from
the origin. Furthermore, from the monotonicity of F (:;:), we have that
Y1 > Y2.
The two curves labelled U1 and U2 are the indi¤erence curves of a social
planner with convex preferences (as in the case of a concave social welfare
function of the type just seen W (¼1;:::;¼I) =
PI
i=1f (¼i), f0 > 0, f00 < 0);
as it is easily seen, if the social planner preferences are convex enough he
would choose the allocation E, that can be obtained only if the institutional
setting is the one giving rise to a VCE. If the social planner would maximize
the total output, the best result would be obtained on the curve Y1, inter-
secting the set of feasible coalitional structures in the points C and D where
there is maximal concentration; any other coalitional structure either would
not get such result or could not be compatible with individual incentives.
In this case, the desired result could be induced by an institutional setting
leading only to PMCE, i.e. perfect mobility.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the outcomes of a coalitional structure for-
mation process among identical agents. The problem arises whenever there
are increasing returns in the production of the commodity, so that there are
incentives to coalesce, but the external e¤ect is not so strong to make cooper-
ation always the dominant action. Notwithstanding that agents can engage
in non-binding pre-play communications, the non-observability of individual
action induces a moral hazard problem, so that people can engage in co-
operative behaviour only when it is individually rational ad self-enforcing.
The point we stress is that the outcome of the coalitional structure forma-
tion game depends crucially on the institutional settings ruling the economy.
If there is perfect social mobility people exploit all opportunities to form
coalitions that are advantageous for someone and the resulting equilibrium
coalitional structure is maximally concentrated, in the sense that people con-
centrate as much as possible in the smallest number of coalitions compatible
with individual incentives. On the other hand, a more constrained institu-
tional setting, in which even a single agent can cast an e¤ective veto, gives
rise to more complex equilibrium coalitional structures that can be not max-
imally concentrated. In this we see a problem of e¢ciency against equity: in
the equilibria with perfect mobility, the aggregate output is maximized, but
the payo¤ of the agent that is in the worst position is certainly lower than the
expected payo¤ of the worst o¤ agent when social mobility is constrained.
The choice of one target (either e¢ciency or equity) may therefore induce
19the choice of an institutional setting more appropriate to the obtainment of
the former.
One of the main limitations of the present work is that we assume identical
agents; heterogeneity may induce further problems, since, in this case, agents
have also the opportunity to choose which, and not only how many, agents
to coalesce with, provided individual characteristics are common knowledge.
In this case also the assumption of a perfectly egalitarian distribution would
not be appropriate, since it seems unreasonable that more able agents accept
an equal distribution of a product which they eventually contribute more.
These is indeed the agenda for our further research.
20A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of the …rst statement is trivial; when an agent is alone his
payo¤ is given by
¼i(lijfig) = A ¢ l
®
i + (1 ¡ li) ¢ !; li 2 [0;1]:
Since A > ! by assumption 1.2, the best choice for a singleton is li = 1.
The proof of the rest of the proposition gets around the properties of the
payo¤ function for di¤erent values of ®. Denote by l¡i :=
P
j2S;j6=i
lj (0 · l¡i ·
(XS ¡ 1)) the level of cooperation supplied by all agents in S except i. Let us
start with the case ® · 1. The payo¤ function, conditional to the fact that
i is already in coalition S with a level l¡i · XS ¡ 1 of expected cooperation
by the others, is given by
¼i (lijS;l¡i) =
A¢ [li + l¡i]
®
XS
+ (1 ¡ li) ¢ !:
By the …rst order condition we have
® ¢
A ¢ [li + l¡i]
®¡1
XS













¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
l¤
i
= ® ¢ (® ¡ 1) ¢
A¢ [li + l¡i]
®¡2
XS
























i is indeed a maximum. Clearly such achoice by agent i ismeaningful
provided l¤














is an upper bound to the number of other
cooperators that an agent can expect in order to(partially) cooperate himself.
If full cooperation is to be observed as an equilibrium behaviour by all agents,
by the above equation it must be true that













In viewof Assumption 1.2 and ® · 1, we have
®¢A
! < 2 and the above equation
entails XS < 2, i.e. full cooperation can never be observed in coalitions with
at least two agents if returns to scale are at most constant.
In any other symmetric equilibrium, the cooperation level supplied by







¡ l ¢ (XS ¡ 1);
where l is the fraction of his own time anyone devolves to production. Solving











Suppose now that returns to scale are increasing, i.e. ® > 1. In this case
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= ® ¢ (® ¡ 1) ¢
A ¢ [li + l¡i]
®¡2
XS






















22so that the solution l¤
i identi…es a minimum of the payo¤ function. By this,







otherwise they will defect.
Before proceeding, we show that all NE are symmetric, i.e. either all
agents defect or cooperate (partial actions are excluded by the previous re-
sult). A contrario, suppose that a NE exists in which there are C < XS
cooperators and XS ¡ C defectors; if this is an equilibrium, any of the C




A¢ (C ¡ 1)
®
XS
¡ ! > 0;
while, for any defector it holds true that






¡ ! < 0:




® ¡ (C ¡ 1)
® > (C + 1)
® ¡ C
®;
that can never be veri…ed for ® > 1. It follows that all equilibria must be
symmetric, either with full cooperation or defection.






which is always true, in view of Assumption 1.2, in any proper coalition
(XS ¸ 2). This proves point 3) of Proposition 1.
Next we show that, whenever ® ¸ 2, full cooperation is a NE in any S ,
the grand coalition included. It is su¢cient to prove this statement for the


















>From Assumption 1.2 the right-hand side of the above inequality is always
lower than 1, while the left-hand side is always greater than 1 in any proper
23coalition and increasingwith XS. It followsthat the condition for cooperation
is satis…ed for any XS.
Finally we prove that for any S with XS · I, there is a value ®S such
that, for ® > ®S, full cooperation is a NE in S. In a generic coalition of









>From the previous point, we know that it is certainly satis…ed for ® ¸ 2;















S ¢ lnXS ¡ (XS ¡ 1)
® ¢ ln(XS ¡ 1)] > 0:










Clearly for all ® > ®I ´ ®¤ < 2 cooperation will be an equilibrium in any
coalition. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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